Incomplete cooperative games with player-centered information

Martin Černý , Michel Grabisch (1)

1 CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne

The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually employs values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, the values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to high costs associated with their determination or simply because it is not possible to determine them exactly. We introduce a method to approximate standard solution concepts based only on partial characteristic function of the cooperative game. In this paper, we build on our previous results and generalise the results of our methods to a significantly larger class of structures of incomplete information.

Keywords: Cooperative game Incomplete game Shapley value Core τ -value; Cooperative game; Incomplete game; Shapley value; Core; τ -value

Domains: Computer Science [cs]

Martin Černý, Michel Grabisch. Incomplete cooperative games with player-centered information. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 2024, 346, pp.62-79. ⟨10.1016/j.dam.2023.12.007⟩. ⟨hal-04356834⟩