CONTRIBUTION A L'ETUDE DE LA QUALITE DE L'AUDIT

Abstract : In business management, audit seems to be a key element of corporate governance which contributes to improve the quality of financial reporting. For this purpose, it plays an essential role in reducing the information asymmetry between stakeholders and in ensuring the credibility of accounting numbers disclosed. Firms must be audited by competent and independent auditors. In this academic area, since the seminal studies of Watts and Zimmerman (1979), and DeAngelo (1981), the operationalization of audit quality remains critical for researchers, because of its unobservable character. This thesis, hereby, proposes an analytical framework for audit and empirically examines the economic consequences of this procedure for stakeholders. On the one hand, focusing on an institutional context of implied audit (i.e. WAEMU), and based on a sample made of commercial banks over 2006-2010, we find that audit quality through mandatory joint audit is complementary to traditional corporate governance mechanisms. On the other hand, under an explicit audit context, we test an original proxy for audit quality and study its economic consequences for French listed companies over the period 2006-2013. Our results suggest that the higher single and joint auditor independence are, (1) the better earnings quality is, (2) the less implied cost of equity is, (3) the higher disclosure on goodwill impairment testing is, which leads financial analysts to greater earnings forecast revisions.
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https://hal-upec-upem.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01429259
Contributor : Alassane Ouattara <>
Submitted on : Saturday, January 7, 2017 - 2:55:16 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, July 18, 2019 - 2:50:02 PM
Long-term archiving on : Saturday, April 8, 2017 - 12:16:14 PM

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Alassane Ouattara. CONTRIBUTION A L'ETUDE DE LA QUALITE DE L'AUDIT. Gestion et management. Université Paris-Est, 2016. Français. ⟨tel-01429259⟩

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