Energy futures from the social market economy to the Energiewende

The chapter tells the story of energy transformation (Energiewende) scenarios in West Germany. Based on abandonment of nuclear energy and its replacement by energy savings and renewable energy sources, as well as transformation of energy systems from centralized to decentralized production, transition scenarios profoundly influenced and transformed the German energy debate, while at the same time losing some of their more radical implications in the process of institutionalization in official expertise. By retracing this history, the chapter shows how energy forecasting in post-war Germany was embedded in political struggles over energy and economic policy, and how the use of scenarios by the environmental movement led to a politicization and pluralization of energy futures. 1/27/2015 6244-0555-003.docx 93

Abstract: The chapter tells the story of energy transformation (Energiewende) scenarios in West Germany. Based on abandonment of nuclear energy and its replacement by energy savings and renewable energy sources, as well as transformation of energy systems from centralized to decentralized production, transition scenarios profoundly influenced and transformed the German energy debate, while at the same time losing some of their more radical implications in the process of institutionalization in official expertise. By retracing this history, the chapter shows how energy forecasting in post-war Germany was embedded in political struggles over energy and economic policy, and how the use of scenarios by the environmental movement led to a politicization and pluralization of energy futures.
1960s in a majority of industrialized countries. The first forecasting studies originated at the American RAND Corporation in a context of Cold War nuclear confrontation, 6 whereas French planning circles developed and theorized "strategic forecasting" or "la prospective" as a method to rationalize decision-making and investment decisions for big industrial projects in a quickly changing sociotechnical environment. 7 Whereas this first line of forecasting techniques were based on a belief in science and the "knowability" of the future, 8 growing environmental consciousness, debates about possible Limits to Growth 9 and the emancipatory impetus of the peace, civil rights and environmental movements inspired new approaches in the 1970s, including "doomsday scenarios" aiming to raise consciousness of the unsustainability of current lifestyles and production and consumption patterns, 10 the use of the scenario technique to represent alternative futures, 11 and participatory future-making practices. 12 Forecasting and scenario techniques were used extensively in the energy field throughout the analyzed period. The first global estimations of future energy demand are even older. They originated from the meetings of the World Power Conferences (the precursor of the World Energy Council), and were issued already in the 1920s. Several decades later, global studies like IIASA's Energy in a Finite World 13 modeled the global energy system and sketched possible future developments in energy consumption and production as a response to growing worries about limited energy resources. 14 Since the 1990s, the International Energy Agency, an international organization founded in 1973 after the first oil crisis, has released annual forecasts Forecasting techniques emerged in the 1950s and 1960s in Germany and elsewhere with the promise to "rationalize" energy policy-making through a clarification of available policy options and a structured discussion of their foreseeable effects. This was part of a wider trend to science-based policy advice in the legislative process. 15 But a look at their history and the controversies and struggles of which they were objects suggests the "rationalization" paradigm Forecasts had indeed performative effects and also a legitimizing function. But both of these paradigms finally stipulate the superiority of one set of actors and practices-either scientists and expertise, or politicians and ideology-over the other, and miss therefore the more subtle interplay between science and politics in the making of energy futures. I aim to show in the following analysis that forecasts and scenarios were part of a complex and contentious coproduction 26 process in which the shaping of scientific methods of foreseeability and the Coal and Steel put an end to regulated prices. Together, these developments presented an These institutes developed econometric models that over time were increasingly sophisticated concerning energy production and consumption. 46 By introducing complex modeling methodology that could only be understood and thus only be challenged by a handful of actors, these energy forecasts were a fundamental source of expertise for the West German state. Indeed, they served the federal government and its administration by legitimizing energy policy objectives of the social market economy. Dominant models were embedded in powerful actor networks and they reproduced those actors' views. 47 This changed in the aftermath of the oil crises, as predictive models failed, but also with the emergence of new actors and methods as a result of the controversy over nuclear energy.

Politicizing the Future: Energy Scenarios in the Nuclear Controversy
The two oil crises (1973 and 1979) were a fundamental shock to this projected, stable future of increasing growth and energy consumption. The failure of dominant econometric models, based until now on the tight coupling of economic growth and energy demand, to predict and properly explain a situation where rising prices led to increased energy conservation, efficiency and a diminishing overall energy demand, triggered the development of new types of models and forecasting practices. 48 A central economic controversy in this context was about the "elasticity" of energy demand, a notion that refers to the reaction of energy consumers to the variability of energy prices. Economic models were built on the premise that overall demand wasn't affected by prices, a dogma that was increasingly contested in the 1970s. 49 This made it possible to think about ways to decouple growth from energy demand through more efficient use of resources. But The Energiewende report was designed rhetorically as an argument of guerilla warfare.
Following a common slogan on guerilla warfare that suggests to "draw back your fist before you strike," 65 the authors first made concessions to the dominant German energy discourse. In the subtitle, "growth and prosperity without oil and uranium," the authors indicated that their vision of a radical energy turnaround did not entail material sacrifices, and did not imply a radical departure from Germany's post-war ideology combining market liberalism and a social contract based on growth. Thus, the authors explicitly stressed-and regretted-that their scenario was not as radical as would have been an actual soft path scenario for Germany. They highlighted that they based their scenario on official growth prognosis, that it did not entail deep structural changes in the economy (e.g., deindustrialization or service economy, 66 which would have been radical departures from industrialism), nor drastic changes in energy consumption patterns (for instance through life-style changes) or infrastructure (e.g. modal switch from road to rail). The authors thus qualified their method as a "technical fix scenario," aiming at satisfying projected energy needs even of "overtly growth-euphoric forecasts." 67 But they then operated a series of strategic displacements in the report, by redefining some basic notions and concepts from the established energy debate. Thus, they proposed a bottom-up approach based on "energy services" 68 -heat, light, kinetic force, transportation, and so on-instead of aggregated demand, explicitly criticizing the domination of the energy discourse by economists and arguments derived from neoclassical theory. The main argument was that customers don't ask for particular energy carriers (coal, gas, oil) or kilowatt-hours of electricity, but for specific services. This made it possible to reconceptualize energy efficiency as a possible source of energy, and hence to popularize one of the main insights of Lovins' and Meyer-Abich's work in a way that was understandable for the general public. 69 The report was also carefully designed to create alliances with major actors in the West German energy debate. Thus, despite the well-known ecological and health damages caused by coal, the report justified continued coal use, highlighting its quality as a domestic and German resource ("heimische Kohle"), thus building argumentative bridges to the trade unions and their historical ally, the SPD, as well as to the coal industry. After thus redefining the terms of the debate, the study concentrated its attacks on three particular elements of the German energy debate: first, the assumption of a tight coupling between economic growth and energy demand; second, the concentration of energy policy on the production-side; third, the reliance on oil and nuclear as basic pillars of the energy system. In other words, it focused on the very bulk of assumptions of post-war forecasts. The scenariotechnique played a central role in order to set this argument out.
Most of the report was consecrated to a detailed analysis of future energy needs and corresponding energy services. On the basis of this analysis, the report proposed three scenarios. 70 The first one, a "business-as-usual" scenario 71 assuming unchanged production and consumption patterns, was dismissed by the authors as economically, ecologically and politically unrealistic. 72 The second one, labeled "Coal and Gas," was a concession to those who "don't give much on renewables." 73 These two scenarios were set up, in fact, to privilege the third one, "Sun and Coal," which clearly had the favor of the authors and was qualified as "most realistic." The authors argued that increasing reliance on oil was not an option, as debates about "peak oil" suggested the resource was scarce and prices prone to increase sharply in the future. They also dismissed its substitution with nuclear energy because of the hidden costs and risks associated with this form of energy (risk of major accidents, unresolved nuclear waste storage, etc.). Both oil and nuclear energy, as well as gas, were also criticized for being imported resources, hence undermining German energy autonomy, whereas the "sun and coal" scenario had the unique advantage of granting near self-sufficiency to German energy needs.
The report did not call for de-growth or zero growth. This was advocated in the American The first reactions to the report were nonetheless hostile: the study received little media attention, 76 and a group from Kernforschungszentrum (KFA) Jülich, a major nuclear power research institution, issued a counterpamphlet with the similar title "Energiewende?" to refute the arguments of the Öko-Institut. 77 But this attack backfired: entering grounds that were unfamiliar to them, the nuclear researchers themselves made miscalculations that they had to correct before finally withdrawing their counter-report altogether. 78 If anything, the KFA Jülich report finally resulted in increased publicity to the theses of the Energiewende report.
The long-term influence of the Energiewende scenario on German energy discourse can hardly be overestimated. It certainly succeeded in its claim to re-politicize the energy debate by redefining what is an objective practical constraint ("Sachzwang") and what should be seen as a mere constraint to thinking ("Denkzwang") due to the dominant energy gap discourse. 79 For the authors of the study, official forecasts that consistently overestimated future energy demand were

Negotiating the Future: Scenarios in Parliamentary Enquete Commissions
The alternative visions expressed in the Energiewende scenario would be progressively institutionalized in the German energy debate, as the Öko-Institut was asked to contribute scenarios to two parliamentary Enquete Commissions-the first one on "future nuclear energy policy" (Zukünftige Kernenergiepolitik, 1979-1982, and the second on "precaution for the protection of the Earth's atmosphere" (Vorsorge zum Schutz der Erdatmosphäre, 1987-1990).
The scenarios elaborated by the institute on these occasions were halfway between the two energy paths, "Coal and Gas" and "Coal and Sun," of the original Energiewende report. Through these two commissions, the radical Energiewende scenarios were transformed into an official option for the West German energy future.
These two commissions are of particular interest because they profoundly influenced the German energy debate and because of the particular use the commissions made of the scenario instrument. Organized in the aftermath of major nuclear accidents, the commissions formulated different "energy paths" that described energy futures with and without nuclear energy. The first commission's influence was mainly discursive, in the sense that its use of the scenario By elaborating several different energy paths, establishing a set of evaluation criteria, and forging consensual recommendations for the next ten years, the commission delegated the final decision on the structure of the German energy system to the political system. The fact, however, that it considered a nuclear phase-out to be a viable option at all, was an important success for the anti-nuclear movement.
Following the Chernobyl accident in 1986, the German energy debate was again repoliticized. Chernobyl gave a new dynamic to the anti-nuclear movement and accelerated the German social democrat's turnaround on nuclear energy. 93 But the year 1986 also marked the beginning of a broad public debate on climate change. The initial impetus for this debate came from a short pamphlet issued by the energy working group of the German physician's association, which warned of an "impending man-made climate catastrophe," a message that was taken up by the news magazine der Spiegel in a title story shortly after. 94  of eighteen members, with nine scientists coming from different branches of the atmospheric sciences (four members), energy and economical sciences (four members) and international law (one member). It issued a report that comprised a scientific analysis of the ozone hole and climate change problems, a discussion of the international energy situation, and the respective responsibilities of different countries, as well as a blueprint for an international climate convention. The heart of the report, however, was constituted by 420 pages on energy policy, including a reference scenario and three scenarios that responded to a fixed objective of thirty percent reductions of CO 2 emissions. The difference between these three scenarios was to be found mainly in the projections concerning the use of nuclear energy. The first scenario, "Energy policy," was based on the assumption of a stable development of nuclear energy, while market forces were to drive the composition of the rest of the energy mix. The second energy path, "Nuclear expansion," aimed at meeting the reduction essentially through an industrial energy policy whose objective was to substitute nuclear to coal. The third scenario finally, "Nuclear phase-out," proposed a progressive substitution of nuclear by renewables, gas and energy savings until 2005. 96 Like the 1979 commission on nuclear energy, the climate commission used the scenario methodology to issue consensual recommendations while explicitly delegating the question of nuclear energy to the political system. This was expressed in the commission report as follows: The commission is convinced that the dangers that result of the enhanced greenhouse effect can only be avoided if the political system endorses the leading role that democracy assigns to it . . . for the commission, this results in the task to adopt a discursive working method for decision-making, in which political The analysis in this chapter shows that the "future" in energy forecasts is not something outside the present. It is on the contrary closely tied to the political, social and scientific debates of the time when the forecasts were made. 99 In other words, the future of scenarios tells us more about the society that made those scenarios than about the future itself. In West Germany, energy forecasts reflected fundamental values and normative assumptions about economic growth, social stability and the desirability of specific energy technologies that were embedded in forecasting practices, economic theory and modeling techniques. As a consequence, the evolution of West German society and politics was reflected in and shaped by the forecasts and scenarios we discussed here.
This has implications for the study of foresight practices and social movements: what some regretted as a progressive "scientization" of the ecological movement through increasing reliance on expert knowledge has indeed led to an opening up of energy futures the West German energy debate. The future became political 100 in the sense that social movements used the instrument of scenarios to engage in energy controversies. Alongside the occupation of construction sites, mass demonstrations and the blocking of nuclear transports, scenarios emerged as a part of the contentious repertoire 101 used by the anti-nuclear movement to make its voice heard and influence German energy policy.
Another important conclusion is that the effects of forecasts and scenarios depend on the uses that actors make of them, the practices attached to them and the political struggles they are Today, the historical window in which a pluralization of energy futures took place may be closing again, as the official energy vision expressed in the Energiekonzept "energy concept" for the Bundesrepublik, a plan defining goals and a schedule until 2050 for the evolution of the German energy system concerning the nuclear phase-out, the increase of renewables and of energy efficiency, as well as emission reduction targets, emerges as a unique official future designed to put the actors of the German energy turnaround to work. Similar to the late 1970s, however, contestation by social movements of the direction taken by the Energiewende may well result in the emergence of new alternative future visions that re-politicize parts of the energy debate.