Multiple Large Shareholders and Owner-Manager Compensation: Evidence from French Listed firms

Abstract : The objective of this study is to examine the relation between complex ownership structures and managerial compensation. More specifically, we examine the impact of the owner-manager’s excess control and the presence of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on the owner-manager’s compensation. Using a sample of French publicly listed firms, the results reveal several important points. First, the owner-manager’s compensation increases with the owner-manager’s excess control. This finding indicates that managers use their power to increase their pay, hence expropriating minority shareholders. Second, the presence of MLS decreases managerial opportunism and prevents owner-managers from diverting corporate resources for their own benefit. Hence, MLS play an important monitoring role.
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Journal articles
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https://hal-upec-upem.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01158102
Contributor : Sabri Boubaker <>
Submitted on : Friday, May 29, 2015 - 3:20:03 PM
Last modification on : Friday, October 4, 2019 - 1:35:23 AM

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Sarra Amdouni, Sabri Boubaker. Multiple Large Shareholders and Owner-Manager Compensation: Evidence from French Listed firms. Journal of Applied Business Research, Clute Institute, 2015, 31 (3), pp.1119-1130. ⟨hal-01158102⟩

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