Geographic Location, Excess Control Rights and Cash Holdings

Abstract : We assess the extent to which remotely-located firms are likely to discretionarily accumulate cash rather than distribute it to shareholders. We consider that these firms are less subject to shareholder scrutiny and, thus, will have high agency conflicts as the distance will facilitate the extraction of private benefits. Consistent with our predictions, we find a positive relation between the distance to the main metropolitan area and cash holdings, and this impact is more pronounced when the controlling shareholder has high levels of excess control rights (i.e., separation of cash-flow rights and control rights). Our results hold even after accounting for all control variables, including financial constraints, and suggest that geographic remoteness can be conducive to severe agency problems, particularly when there is a large separation of cash-flow rights and control rights.
Document type :
Journal articles
Complete list of metadatas

https://hal-upec-upem.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01158100
Contributor : Sabri Boubaker <>
Submitted on : Friday, May 29, 2015 - 3:13:08 PM
Last modification on : Thursday, July 18, 2019 - 2:50:02 PM

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01158100, version 1

Collections

Citation

Sabri Boubaker, Imen Derouiche, Meziane Lasfer. Geographic Location, Excess Control Rights and Cash Holdings. International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, 2014, pp.00-00. ⟨http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521914001008⟩. ⟨hal-01158100⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

128