2IRG - Institut de Recherche en Gestion (Université Paris-Est Créteil Val de Marne (UPEC) -Faculté de sciences économiques et de gestion
Place de la Porte des Champs , 4 Route de Choisy 94010 Créteil Cedex - France)
LOG - Laboratoire Orléanais de Gestion (Université d'Orléans - Faculté de Droit, d'Economie et de Gestion Rue de Blois, BP 6739 45 067 ORLEANS Cedex 2 Téléphone : + 33 (0)2 38 49 47 32 Télécopie : +33 (0)2 38 49 48 16 - France)
UO - Université d'Orléans : EA 2635 (Château de la Source - Avenue du Parc Floral - BP 6749 - 45067 Orléans cedex 2 - France)
Abstract : We investigate the role of managerial overconfidence in shaping corporate debt financing policy. Using a sample of 229 small French companies listed during 2003–2012, we show that overconfident owner–managers opt for less levered financing structures than their non-owner peers. Additional analysis shows that owners–managers are less likely to use debt in the presence of growth opportunities. Managers who are optimistic about future performance consider their firms to be undervalued and prefer internal financing to external capital markets that are considered highly costly. They consequently adopt a pecking order preference in financing decisions, particularly when they perceive the new projects as value increasing.
https://hal-upec-upem.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01155607
Contributor : Sabri Boubaker
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Submitted on : Wednesday, May 27, 2015 - 12:45:00 AM
Last modification on : Friday, October 4, 2019 - 1:38:08 AM
